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aLI m. aBId
Restorative Justice in the Gilded Age: Shared Principles Un-
derlying Two Movements in Criminal Justice
I. InTroducTIon
A 
man accused of a robbery is brought before mem-
bers of his own community. He is encouraged to 
speak on his own behalf, and he freely admits to 
the offense. Nevertheless, he asks for mercy, not 
because he can point to any 
particular defenses as we know 
them, but rather he argues that 
his desperation leading up 
to the act, his deep remorse, 
and his willingness to repair 
the damage he inflicted to his 
victim should negate his guilt. 
In determining the man’s 
punishment, the community 
members are permitted to take 
all these factors into account, 
scrutinizing his remorse, aug-
menting his plan for reparation, 
and, if they so choose, deciding 
against punishment altogether. The impartial mediator presiding 
over the proceeding, and the person responsible for bringing the 
victim’s case against the offender, are also members of the same 
community and are directly accountable to that community for 
how they conduct themselves. Under this system, both punish-
ment and crime are rare; the administration of justice is appor-
tioned equally among races and classes; and recidivism is low.
Which criminal justice system is this? It is certainly not 
the criminal justice system of the United States. Juries in the 
United States are tasked with determining the fact of guilt, not 
evaluating how morally deserving a defendant is of punishment. 
Juries are not, typically, members of the immediate community 
of the defendant, and judges and prosecutors are not politically 
accountable to those communities, but rather, to broader voting 
populations.1 Trials are rare and the procedure is complex.2
Furthermore, the U.S. system does not produce the same 
effects as the hypothetical system described above. The scan-
dal of mass incarceration in the U.S. is, by now, well known. 
According to a 2008 study by the Pew Center, one in every 
one hundred American adults is behind bars.3 The system’s 
disproportionate impact upon the African American popula-
tion is similarly notorious, with one of every nine black men 
between the ages of twenty and thirty-four in prison or in jail.4 
And, despite the nine-fold increase in state and federal prison 
populations since the early 1970s, the recidivism rate has 
remained intransigent, with well over fifty percent of offenders 
re-entering prison within three years of release.5
The informal and com-
munal system outlined above 
existed in this country in the 
past, and two very different 
criminal justice movements 
would like to see its revival. 
The first is the Restorative 
Justice movement, which has 
spawned hundreds of victim 
and offender mediation pro-
grams around the world and 
draws its practices from the 
peacemaking circles of Native 
American tribes.6 The second 
movement is the culmination of the work of historians and 
legal scholars on the criminal justice system of American cities 
during the Gilded Age, a system marked by its local community 
control and low crime rate.7 Even though these movements have 
developed separately, this Article argues that they share many 
principles and may be of great use to one another.
Since the mid-1970s, a majority of states in the U.S. 
and dozens of countries around the world have implemented 
Restorative Justice mechanisms to reduce rates of recidivism 
and revitalize communities plagued by crime.8 Restorative 
Justice focuses on reintegrating the offender within the com-
munity by making him or her understand the harm caused by the 
offense and having him or her directly repair the damage to the 
victim.9 The movement characterizes “crime” as, the violation 
of one person against another, rather than as an offense against 
the state.10 Restorative Justice programs take many forms, such 
as, victim-offender mediation, family group counseling, peace-
making circles involving members of the community, and other 
methods by which the community, the offender, and the victim 
interact.11 By gaining a renewed sense of their community and 
the impact of the offense, it is argued that individuals are far 
30 Fall 2012
less likely to reoffend and that victims’ needs are met more fully 
than through the conventional criminal justice system.12
Most Restorative Justice practitioners and theorists draw 
the roots of their movement from the justice systems of native 
and aboriginal groups throughout the world and from historical 
accounts of the justice systems in the West before the eleventh 
century.13 They argue that the psychological and communitarian 
principles behind Restorative Justice have been ignored in the 
West ever since the state takeover of the criminal justice system 
in the early feudal era.14 Reviving this system, however, has 
presented many problems for Restorative Justice proponents, 
including trying to dispel fears that this system may not comport 
with individuals’ constitutional protections.15
The second approach to criminal justice that this Article 
examines does not have an identifying name. Supporters of 
this approach include criminal justice historians, legal scholars, 
and political conservatives and liberals alike, who would like 
to see a return to the criminal justice mechanisms that existed 
in the urban centers of the U.S. during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.16 During this time, known as the 
Gilded Age, the cities of the Northeast and Midwest had, by our 
standards today, small inmate populations, low levels of crime, 
and—perhaps most surprisingly—less discriminatory treatment 
of suspect classes.17
To explain this viewpoint, this Article will draw particu-
larly upon the work of William J. Stuntz, the former Henry J. 
Friendly professor of law at Harvard University, who argues in 
his book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, that the 
loss of local democratic control over criminal justice mecha-
nisms, coupled with the criminal procedure innovations introduced 
by the Warren Court, led to the ‘tough on crime’ political 
backlash that has fueled the rise in incarceration.18 During the 
Gilded Age, political power over judges, prosecutors, and police 
forces came from those very same communities who were most 
often faced with criminal punishment, as did the pool of jurors.19 
Furthermore, trial procedures were simple, and the legal defini-
tion of crimes made them open to the types of defenses and 
moral evaluations illustrated in the hypothetical at the beginning 
of this Article.20 This, Stuntz and others argue, created a system 
that was at once lenient and effective.
Proponents of Restorative Justice and the proponents of 
a return to the Gilded Age system use different terminology, 
suggest different reforms, and draw their movements from 
different origins.21 Yet this Article argues that these move-
ments share key principles, and the forms of criminal justice 
they fight for bear strong resemblances to one another. These 
shared principles include communitarianism and flexibility in 
the administration of justice. Specifically, this Article argues 
that the Restorative Justice community does itself a disservice 
by describing itself as wholly foreign to the criminal justice 
system of the United States. The successful mechanisms used 
by the justice system of urban centers in the Gilded Age, can 
provide new tools for the Restorative Justice movement and 
answer many of its critics.
Part II of this Article describes various aspects of the 
Restorative Justice movement: the criminological theory of 
reintegrative shaming on which many restorative programs 
are based; its procedures; and its effect on victims and com-
munities. Part III illustrates the movement’s origins and current 
controversies surrounding its implementation. Part IV describes: 
the criminal justice system that existed in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries in America, how it came to be, its chief 
characteristics—which allowed it to keep down both crime and 
prison populations, and how the United States transitioned from 
that system to our current system. Part V describes the shared 
principles of communitarianism and flexibility in the admin-
istration of criminal justice that unites both the Restorative 
Justice movement with justice from the Gilded Age, and how 
the justice system of the Gilded Age can inform Restorative 
Justice and respond to its critics.
II. resToraTIve JusTIce:  
PrIncIPLes, mechanIsms, and cLaIms
a. The concePT of shame: ITs LIghTer  
 and darKer sIdes
There was a time in the West when public shaming was 
a prominent part of criminal punishment. Chain gangs, public 
floggings, and pillorying were once common forms of public 
humiliation for the convicted.22 Generally, the “uncoupling of 
shame and punishment” was celebrated, but Restorative Justice 
theorists seek to reclaim the idea of shame and stress its impor-
tance as part of crime control.23 Restorative Justice supporters 
distinguish, however, between destructive, stigmatizing shaming, 
and redemptive, reintegrating shaming.24 The conventional 
criminal justice system, they argue, stigmatizes offenders, 
which prevents them from ever re-entering legitimate society, 
and pushes them into criminal subcultures.25 Reintegrative 
shaming, as produced through Restorative Justice techniques, 
forces the offender to experience shame and remorse over their 
criminal act, but then allows them to re-enter legitimate society 
with their dignity restored.26
1. Stigma in the Conventional Criminal Justice System
Proponents of Restorative Justice argue that the conven-
tional criminal justice system focuses too much on assigning 
blame and inflicting punishment.27 This has the effect of stig-
matizing the offender in a way that prevents his reintegration 
with legitimate society, while at the same time insulating the 
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offender from the harm he caused to the victim and his own 
potential feelings of remorse.28
John Braithwaite, who first formulated the criminological 
theory of reintegrative shaming, describes the stigmatizing 
effect of prison as follows:
Prisons are schools for crime; offenders learn new 
skills for the illegitimate labor market in prison and be-
come more deeply enmeshed in criminal subcultures. 
Prison can be an embittering experience that leaves 
offenders more angry at the 
world than when they went 
in. The interruption to a career 
in the legitimate labor market 
and the stigma of being an 
ex-con can reduce prospects 
of legitimate work on comple-
tion of the sentence.29
Once an ex-felon experiences 
this sort of rejection he or she may 
seek out criminal subcultures that 
“reject their rejectors.”30 Criminal 
activity becomes an easier way 
for them to earn a living and 
criminal subcultures become the 
only communities from which 
they draw respect.31
In some communities, par-
ticularly those facing a dispro-
portionate amount of criminal 
punishment, criminal subcultures 
are more pronounced and can be 
more attractive to some than law-abiding communities.32 In an 
interview, Howard Zehr, another prominent Restorative Justice 
scholar, relates a conversation about shame and respect he 
had with a prisoner serving a life sentence without parole in a 
Pennsylvania prison:
I said, ‘When you were growing up in North Philly, 
what gave you shame and what gave you respect?’ 
And he said, ‘Well, what gave me respect is what  
you would think should give me shame.’ He said, … 
‘I remember my first arrest. I rode through my com-
munity in the back of that police car, and it was the 
proudest moment of my life. I had become a man.’33
This inversion of values and sources of esteem is the 
product of stigma and is encouraged by the procedures of the 
conventional criminal justice system.34 Plea-bargaining and 
criminal trials, in the conventional system, are focused on 
assigning an individualistic version of blame.35 The crimes are 
also presented in abstract and archaic ways, multiple charges 
are the subject of bargaining and are exchanged for lesser or 
greater charges depending on the offender’s willingness to com-
ply.36 These procedures are at odds with how offenders view 
their actions (not as individual decisions, but as guided by their 
environment) and that disconnect allows them to adopt exculpa-
tory psychological strategies to insulate themselves from the 
immense stigma the system is attempting to put on them.37
John Braithwaite summarizes the five major exculpatory 
strategies as follows: “denial of victim (‘We weren’t hurting 
anyone’); denial of injury (‘They 
can afford it’); condemnation of 
condemners (‘They’re crooks 
themselves’); denial of responsi-
bility (‘I was drunk’); and appeal 
to higher authorities (‘I had to 
stick by my mates’).”38 Because 
the system focuses on their guilt 
to such a large extent, and because 
the stigmatic costs are so high, 
offenders also focus on what they 
see as their persecution and on the 
mitigating factors of their crime.39 
What offenders do not focus on—
and what is not encouraged by the 
conventional system—is accepting 
responsibility for their crimes, the 
effect of the crimes on their vic-
tims, and how the offender might 
make reparation and re-enter 
legitimate society. Reintegrative 
shaming, it is argued, brings these 
more helpful concerns to the fore.40
2. Reintegrative Shaming
Shame, many proponents of Restorative Justice argue, is 
a necessary and good component of society and reflects our 
communal, rather than individual, nature.41 Shame reminds us 
of the “deep mutual involvement we have with one another.”42 
These interdependencies do not limit our independence, but are 
in fact necessary for freedom.43 John Braithwaite theorizes that 
we can shame without stigmatizing, and that shame is a neces-
sary part of crime control.44 This theory is based on the insight 
that the “individuals who resort to crime are those insulated 
from shame over their wrongdoing.”45 The goal is then not to 
shame so permanently that offenders start drawing their concep-
tions of right and wrong from criminal subcultures, but to shame 
enough so that they are brought back into conformity with the 
legitimate society. For these reasons, reintegrative shaming has 
two chief characteristics that distinguish it from stigmatizing 
shaming: (1) finite, rather than indefinite, duration; and (2) ef-
forts to maintain the bonds of respect throughout the process.46
The goal is then not to 
shame so permanently that 
offenders start drawing 
their conceptions of right 
and wrong from criminal 
subcultures, but to shame 
enough so that they are 
brought back into conformity 
with the legitimate society.
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The following section examines how this principle is 
implemented.
B. The meThods of resToraTIve JusTIce  
 and ITs ouTcomes
1. Encounters Between the Stakeholders
Restorative Justice programs take many forms, including 
victim-offender mediation and reconciliation programs 
(VORPS), family group conferencing, peacemaking circles, 
and more.47 What they all have in common is that they feature a 
facilitated conversation between the primary stakeholders in the 
conflict (the victim, the offender, and representatives of their 
community or communities) about the impact of the offense 
and what can be done to restore the parties to their previous 
positions.48 In these encounters, the parties are encouraged 
to speak for themselves rather than through lawyers.49
The relevant community to be included varies depending 
on the nature of the offense.50 The role of the community 
here is to express shame regarding the offender’s actions, 
while at the same time displaying respect and openness to the 
offender as a person.51 The community members also prevent the 
offender—due to their deep knowledge of him or her—from 
adopting the exculpatory psychological strategies that insulate 
one from feelings of remorse. Stated alternatively, they know 
the offender well enough to detect when he or she is making 
excuses or being dishonest.52 For certain smaller offenses, only 
the families of the victims and offender may be necessary.53 For 
crimes that affect larger sections of the population, the com-
munity members involved in the proceeding should be drawn 
from the neighborhood or several neighborhoods that were 
hurt by the offender’s actions.54
The third party mediator is tasked with facilitating the 
conversation between the primary stakeholders to make sure 
that everyone’s needs are met, and to prevent the conversation 
from taking harmful routes towards stigmatization on the part 
of the community or exculpatory strategies on the part of the 
offender.55 The final plan for reparation developed by the as-
sembled parties need not represent the optimal solution to the 
third party facilitator, but must only be mutually beneficial to 
the group developing it.56 The reparation plans (or sentences) 
need not be based on precedent; rather, flexibility and “demo-
cratic creativity” is encouraged.57 In fact, the reparation plans 
must be flexible to both reflect the harms done to the particular 
victim and the requisite steps for the particular offender to 
re-enter legitimate society.58
Restorative Justice programs distinguish themselves from 
conventional trials in a number of ways. The conventional trial 
is formal and meets in a courthouse, the language used during 
the process is technical, emotions are minimized, and victims 
and offenders certainly do not engage in direct communication.59 
Conversely, Restorative Justice programs are informal (often 
meeting in community centers), use layspeak (describing the 
acts in terms that relate to the experience of the parties), center 
the process on the expression of emotion, and encourage direct 
verbal communication between the parties.60
2. Three Stages: Awareness, Shame and Censure, 
Redemption and Restoration
The goal of Restorative Justice programs are to move the 
primary stakeholders through three phases: (1) awareness of harm; 
(2) shame and censure; and (3) restoration and redemption.61
First, the offender must become aware of the full impact 
of his crime on the victim and the community.62 As mentioned 
earlier, the conventional criminal justice system allows the 
offender to adopt certain neutralizing, exculpatory tech-
niques, but, in Restorative Justice conferences, the offender is 
confronted directly with the words of the victim and of the 
community.63 The excuses that the offender might resort to in 
a conventional trial — that the victim deserved it, could afford 
it, and so on — are challenged.
Second, the community and victim are allowed to express 
anger and frustration at the actions of the offender.64 However, 
the community must maintain that they are condemning the 
actions of the offender and not the offender himself.65 The 
offender then has a chance to feel remorse and express dis-
approval of what he had done. This gives the offender the 
opportunity to separate what he sees as his true self from the 
crime he committed.
Third, the offender is encouraged to help devise and carry 
out a plan of reparation to restore the victim to his status before 
the crime.66 Once this is agreed to, the victim and the commu-
nity may offer to forgive the offender right then or after the 
reparation is complete.67 At some point, the offender is offi-
cially welcomed back into the community in what is commonly 
known as a decertification ceremony.68 This gesture completes 
the Restorative Justice program and announces the restoration 
of not just the victim’s status but also the offender’s status 
before the crime.
i. Outcomes: Effect on Recidivism
One of the major claims of the Restorative Justice move-
ment is that these processes will lower the chance that the 
offenders will offend again. A recent meta-analysis of every 
major Restorative Justice program for juveniles, consist-
ing of a sample size of over 11,000 offenders, found that the 
programs reduced the recidivism rate by twenty-four percent.69 
Furthermore, of those participants who did reoffend, the 
programs reduced both the frequency and seriousness of sub-
sequent offenses.70 Major studies have found recidivism rates 
reduced from anywhere between sixteen percent and thirty-three 
percent following completion of Restorative Justice programs.71 
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In fact, all studies that have examined participants’ offense rates 
before and after restorative sessions found an overall reduction 
in criminal activity after these sessions.72
Multivariate analyses have pointed out certain key factors 
within Restorative Justice programs that correlate strongly with 
reduced reoffending.73 These factors touch upon the offender’s 
experience and include: having a memorable Restorative Justice 
conference, not feeling like an outsider, agreeing with the 
outcome and the methods, and meeting the victim and apologiz-
ing to him or her, or to the family of the victim.74
The dramatic effect that Restorative Justice has on recidi-
vism is not merely due to the self-selection of the offenders who 
choose to participate. Studies have been performed wherein the 
offenders subjected to restorative programs have been selected 
randomly, and the recidivism rates have still decreased.75 In a 
Canadian study, the town of Sparwood, British Columbia sub-
jected all of its juvenile offenders to Restorative Justice programs 
as opposed to the traditional court system for three years and, by 
the second year of the experiment, the recidivism rate had plum-
meted by sixty-seven percent from the pre-experiment average.76
c. ouTcomes: effecT on vIcTIms  
 and communITIes
1. Victims
Despite the subject of the above parts, Restorative Justice 
proponents are quick to point out that it focuses on the needs 
of the victims and communities far more than the conventional 
criminal justice system, which proponents accuse of being too 
offender-focused.77 Indeed, unlike the conventional criminal 
justice system, Restorative Justice characterizes crimes as a 
violation of one person by another, rather than as an abstract 
offense against the state.78 Victims are not given a special place 
in the conventional criminal trial, but are placed on the same 
level as any witness to the crime, where, despite the efforts of 
the victims’ reform movement, many of their most crucial needs 
are not met.79
Howard Zehr posits that there are three phases in a victim’s 
reaction to crime: impact, recoil, and — for those who go 
through something akin to Restorative Justice — recovery.80 
Impact is the initial feeling of trauma following the crime, and 
recoil consists of the shattering of the perception that the world 
is an orderly, meaningful place where our personal autonomy 
is respected.81 Recovery can come through the voluntary 
compensation by the offender to the victim.82 Compensation, 
symbolic or otherwise, that the offender makes to the victim 
through the Restorative Justice process conveys to the victim 
that the offender realizes what he did was wrong and it restores 
those lost conceptions of the recoil phase.83 The Restorative 
Justice program makes victims feel empowered, allowing them 
to speak and assert their self-worth, providing security through 
community involvement, and reassuring them that something 
is being done about the damage inflicted upon them.84
Some who defend the conventional criminal justice system 
say that by having the state punish the offender, the state is in 
essence showing solidarity with the victim and thus, responding 
to their needs.85 Restorative Justice proponents respond by saying 
that the conventional system deprives victims of compensa-
tion because imprisoned offenders are often not able to get 
jobs and pay back their victim from judgments following civil 
suits, and many victims are too poor to litigate civil remedies.86 
Additionally, with high punitive sanctions, offenders will do 
much more to avoid punishment, shying away from acts of apol-
ogy or reparation that they may have otherwise done.87 In other 
words, the offender remains a combatant against the victim and, 
in so doing, further victimizes them.
2. Communities
Restorative Justice’s effect on communities reflects its 
transformative potential. Nils Christie, a prominent Restorative 
Justice scholar, has suggested that Restorative Justice programs 
should not presuppose that conflicts ought to be solved.88 
Rather, conflicts are valuable commodities and it may be more 
important that communities come together and participate in the 
discussion of conflicts, perhaps even living with them, rather 
than assuming that one side must change.89 Although most 
Restorative Justice practitioners and scholars do not go as far as 
Christie, nearly all see conflicts as opportunities for empowering 
the community and changing it for the better.90
This transformative aim comes from the recognition 
that many current communities do not have the strong set of 
interdependencies and communitarian relationships that make 
Restorative Justice effective.91 In many instances, victims 
and offenders do not feel as though they belong to the same 
community at all. By using Restorative Justice mechanisms, 
however, those relationships might be created for the first time. 
Empowerment of the community, according to the work of Bush 
and Folger, comes about when the community members expe-
rience “a strengthened awareness of their own self-worth and 
their own ability to deal with whatever difficulties they face.”92 
This goal is another reason why the third party facilitators must 
not project their views of what the best solution might be onto 
the parties, but rather let the parties come to their own solutions.
For many, the concept of community is defined by the ability 
of groups to handle conflicts. David Cayley summarizes Nil 
Christie’s views on community as follows:
Community, he says, is made from conflict as much 
as from cooperation; the capacity to resolve conflict is 
what gives social relations their sinew. Professionalizing 
justice ‘steals the conflicts’, robbing the community of its 
ability face trouble and restore peace. Communities lose 
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the confidence, their capacity, and finally their inclin-
ation to preserve their own order. They become instead 
consumers of police and court ‘services,’ with the con-
sequence that they largely cease to be communities.93
To Bush and Folger, and most Restorative Justice scholars, 
the effects of mediation reach far beyond the particular people 
involved. Rather, these programs reflect a choice between an 
individual worldview and what they term as a “relational world-
view.”94 In the individual worldview the focus is on meeting an 
individual’s wants and desires, but, in a relational one, the goal 
is transformation that integrates the individual’s strength with 
compassion toward others.95
 Unfortunately, getting grassroots community involvement 
has posed a challenge for Restorative Justice practitioners. Aside 
from the aboriginal and tribal councils that began the modern 
Restorative Justice movement, getting communities from large 
urban centers involved has been quite difficult.96 Some, like 
Tony Marshall, have suggested that these communities lack 
the considerable infrastructure, time, money, and sense of 
community to effectively run involved victim-offender media-
tions.97 These theorists suggest that smaller, simpler programs 
be introduced at first to build up communitarian feeling before 
larger programs can take hold.98 Although these and other diffi-
culties are addressed more thoroughly in Part III(B), on current 
controversies and challenges to the movement, it is important 
to note here that many scholars attribute these difficulties to 
the conventional criminal justice system’s effect on modern 
communities, and the vastly different origins of the Restorative 
Justice movement.99
III. resToraTIve JusTIce:  
orIgIns and conTroversIes
a. orIgIns
Most Restorative Justice scholars claim Restorative Justice 
practices reflect the justice systems in the pre-modern West 
and in the justice systems of native and aboriginal groups 
throughout the world.100 Western countries, including Great 
Britain, abandoned this system of justice in the eleventh century 
when state powers started to monopolize the administration of 
criminal justice and the use of force.101 By the mid-nineteenth 
century, European colonial powers had made their system of 
criminal justice ubiquitous throughout the world, replacing their 
conquered territories’ restorative systems with their preferred 
method of criminal justice.102 Many of the indigenous groups 
in these areas, however, held onto these restorative systems 
and practiced them without official state sanction. Starting in 
the mid-1960s these groups started to reassert the legitimacy 
of their systems.103 The Maori people of New Zealand and 
native Canadian tribes first gained national statutory support 
for peacemaking circles in their countries in the mid-1980s.104 
Since then, these systems have expanded to non-native groups 
and have gained acceptance throughout Europe, Southeast Asia, 
and in the statutory schemes of thirty U.S. states.105
The Restorative Justice proponents’ history of criminal 
justice represents a marked difference from the traditional, 
linear story of the advancement and humanitarian evolution of 
criminal justice.106 The conventional image of “penal progress,” 
as described by Gerry Johnstone, starts with the assumption that 
pre-modern societies were lawless.107 “Justice” largely consisted 
of one party getting vengeance upon the other and this com-
monly led to unending vendettas between families or clans.108 
Slowly this system was replaced with another based on money 
and trade where the offender could buy off vengeance against 
him.109 The offender would pay bot, or betterment, to his victim 
and wite, a fine of sorts, to the king or local feudal lord.110 As the 
central state power grew, fines were systemized and expanded. 
The central power took to demanding fines of those who com-
mitted negligent or accidental wrongs and physically punishing 
those who committed intentional or malicious wrongs.111
Restorative Justice scholars, however, suggest that systems 
of reparation and the use of conferences were in place long 
before the government-imposed system of fines came about.112 
Vendettas and revenge were the exceptions to the rule and only 
happened where restorative processes were weak.113 For modern 
day examples, Restorative Justice scholars point to practices 
from societies that never developed in the Western system, such 
as Navajo peacemaking circles and the Wagga model based on 
the system of the Maori.114 These societies define crime in the 
same way as Restorative Justice practitioners, as a violation of 
one person by another.115 The Navajo process consists of members of 
the community, the victim, and the offender all coming together 
to have a conversation about the act, facilitated by a respected 
member of the community.116 The offender is encouraged to 
arrive at a reparation plan voluntarily.117
Restorative Justice proponents claim that the ubiquity of 
the conventional system may have blinded us to better systems, 
and also to what was lost when we transitioned from restorative 
societies to our current society.118 Specifically, proponents suggest 
that with state takeover of the criminal process, victims became 
neglected, shaming went from reintegrative to stigmatizing, and 
the process became far more costly.119
Many Restorative Justice scholars do not accept the 
pre-modern and indigenous origin story. Kathleen Daly, for 
one, dismisses it as a creation myth that is destructive in that 
it romanticizes and, in a way recolonizes, the past and in-
digenous groups throughout the world.120 Others, like Gerry 
Johnstone, question the utility of the connection, wondering if 
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these pre-modern systems could or should be revived within 
the context of modern communities and criminal law.121
B. conTroversIes
1. Are Modern Communities Capable of Restorative 
Justice?
It is generally acknowledged that we have moved from 
societies of communal relations to ones of non-communal 
relations due to industrialization, urbanization, and the rise of 
technology.122 Modern citizens have less interaction with and 
less knowledge of their direct neighbors.123 Can such weakened 
modern communities shame offenders and bring them back 
into the fold? John Braithwaite, the founder of the reintegrative 
shaming framework, says this is possible if we change what we 
consider a community.124 Instead 
of geographic units, modern com-
munities are collections of people 
with shared interests. Braithwaite 
describes this as follows:
The contemporary city-dweller 
may have a set of colleagues 
at work, in her trade union, 
among members of his golf 
club, among drinking associ-
ates whom he meets at the 
same pub, among members 
of a professional associa-
tion, the parents and citizens’ 
committee for her daugh-
ter’s school, not to mention 
a geographically, extended 
family, where many of these 
significant others can mobilize 
potent disapproval. There are 
actually more interdependen-
cies in the nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century city; it is just 
that they are not geographi-
cally segregated within a 
community.125
Johnstone points out that these communities are not 
necessarily strong enough to exert the kind of influence neces-
sary for Restorative Justice, causing individuals to withdraw 
from these communities at will without suffering any shame 
or harm.126 Furthermore, extending the definition of commu-
nities broadly, risks including the criminal subcultures that 
would not shame an individual for engaging in criminal activ-
ity. Braithwaite responds to these criticisms by claiming that 
for nearly all individuals there are some people in their lives 
that would be capable of exercising enough control over them 
to carry out Restorative Justice processes.127
2. Is Shaming Oppressive? Is it in Accordance  
with Human Rights?
Some commentators have expressed concern over 
encouraging communities to become so deeply involved with 
the criminal justice system by shaming those who violate 
the community’s rules.128 James Whitman, for one, fears that 
stirring up community indignation will result in communi-
ties acting irrationally and oppressively enforcing their own 
mores.129 David Cayley fears that the effect may be to weaken 
already weak parties in the communities.130 He notes that com-
munities are not often egalitarian or homogenous; there are some 
in the community who carry more or less power, and maintain 
more or less socially desirable 
positions within the community.131 
Depending on an offender’s place 
in the social hierarchy, they may 
receive more or less leniency at the 
hands of a Restorative Justice con-
ference, while the victims of these 
offenders may receive more or less 
justice depending on the offenders 
place in the community.132
Johnstone noticed the mani-
festation of some of these issues 
in his study of victim offender 
mediations.133 When this occurs, 
the conferences unravel, resulting 
in degradation ceremonies rather 
than Restorative Justice.134 This 
fear is magnified when one consid-
ers that procedural protections for 
the offender are far more relaxed in 
these programs as compared with a 
conventional criminal trial.135
Restorative Justice proponents 
defend the relaxed procedural 
protections and heightened com-
munity involvement by pointing 
to the underlying principles and how they differ from the 
principles underlying the conventional criminal justice 
system. They argue that as restoration and reparation, not 
punishment, are the results of these processes, procedural and 
constitutional protections are less necessary.136 Communities 
that actually know and care about the reintegration of the 
offender and justice for the victim are far less likely to be vola-
tile or capricious than the highly punitive conventional criminal 
justice system.137 Again, this debate continues.
[M]ost Restorative Justice 
theorists believe that there 
must be balance between 
the “democratic creativity” 
of Restorative Justice 
mechanisms and oversight by 
the state, in order to protect 
minority groups and human 
rights,  but where that 
balance is to be struck is still 
a matter of great debate.
36 Fall 2012
3. Does Community Control Undermine the Rule  
Of Law?
What if an offender is charged by the state for violating 
a law that the community disagrees with? Under a pure 
Restorative Justice system, where the community, offender, 
and victim arrive at a reparation plan together, they may elect 
not to punish the offender at all.138 Would this not undermine 
the rule of law? Could Restorative Justice deal with ‘victimless’ 
crimes? John Braithwaite embraces this uncertainty by saying 
that Restorative Justice might serve as a good measurement of 
what should and should not be criminalized.139 He feels that 
there will always be consensus regarding the criminality of 
certain acts, such as assault, murder, rape, robbery, etc., so there 
is little risk of Restorative Justice leading to a dangerous level of 
lawlessness; and, for other acts, for which there is no consensus 
regarding there reprehensibility, communities should feel free 
to disregard them.140 Johnstone finds this “seriously misguided,” 
as many laws that may be unpopular are necessary for the 
protection of minority groups.141
Again, most Restorative Justice theorists believe that 
there must be balance between the “democratic creativity” of 
Restorative Justice mechanisms and oversight by the state, in 
order to protect minority groups and human rights,142 but where 
that balance is to be struck is still a matter of great debate.
These controversies center on fears of the unintended 
consequences that broad implementation of restorative justice 
mechanisms might have within the framework of modern 
states.143 However, we find that these principles have been 
tested, and to good result, in the U.S. criminal justice system 
just a century ago.144
Iv. resToraTIve JusTIce In The gILded age
Between the mid-nineteenth century and the start of World 
War I, thirty million Europeans made their way to the U.S. and 
settled mostly in the Northern cities and in the industrial belt.145 
Following their arrival, there was an uptick in the crime rate 
that quickly subsided along with inmate populations.146 In the 
first two thirds of the twentieth century, seven million African 
Americans made their way from the South to the cities of the 
Northeast and Midwest, again there was an uptick in the crime 
and incarceration rates, but this one was far more long lasting 
and far more severe.147
At first glance, the difference in impact makes little sense, 
as the reaction to both migrations was initially similar. Both 
migrations caused political backlashes by those already in the 
cities, centering on fear that the arriving populations would 
cause increases in vice and crime.148 In response to the first 
migration of European immigrants, there was a generation of 
legislation dedicated to fighting vices, which resulted in the 
18th Amendment among many other pieces of legislation.149 
However, within a couple generations, at the height of “Morals 
Legislation,” the children of these immigrants were able to gain 
political offices and power at every level of government, from 
local police chiefs and mayors, to state governors and senators, 
and even presidents of the United States.150 The internal migra-
tion of African Americans caused a similar backlash. Notably, 
in 1986, Congress passed a law, which punished the possession 
of one gram of crack cocaine the same as the possession of 
one-hundred grams of powder cocaine.151 African Americans 
were also able to expand their political influence, though 
less comprehensively than the immigrant communities of the 
nineteenth century.152
What caused the difference then? Why did the first migration 
result in only a modest increase in crime and incarceration, 
while the second one resulted in dramatic increases in both? 
William J. Stuntz, in his study of these two migrations and how 
the U.S. criminal justice system has changed over time, argues 
that, although these two groups moved into the same cities and 
amidst the same fears, they were migrating into vastly different 
criminal justice systems.153 This Article argues that the more 
effective criminal justice system of the Gilded Age, to which 
the European immigrant population was delivered, was far more 
in line with Restorative Justice principles.
This Article will now turn to an examination of the Gilded 
Age system in more detail, its crime and incarceration rates, 
origins, chief characteristics, and how the U.S. has transitioned 
from that system to its current system.
a. crImInaL JusTIce In The gILded age
1. Crime and Incarceration Rates were Low  
and Stable
Crimes rates in the Northern and Midwestern cities during 
the Gilded Age were lower and more stable than today.154 For 
example, between 1875 and 1925, the homicide rate in New 
York City hovered steadily between a low of two per every 
100,000 residents to a high of six per every 100,000 residents.155 
Whereas in the period 1950-2000, the lowest rate was four per 
every 100,000 residents—occurring in the early 1950s—and 
the highest was thirty-one per every 100,000 residents.156 Other 
major industrializing cities of the North and Midwest show a 
similar pattern of low and stable rates of homicide during the 
Gilded Age, and then rapidly rising levels of violent crime 
in the second half of the twentieth century until the 1990s.157 
These fluctuations in the homicide rate are representative of the 
fluctuations in the rate of crime as a whole.158
The imprisonment rate was similarly stable and low during 
the Gilded Age.159 The imprisonment rate in New York City 
decreased rather steadily from 1890 to 1925, from 138 to just 
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over 50 per every 100,000 residents.160 Between 1950 and 2000, 
however, the imprisonment rate dipped from one-hundred in 
1950 to just over fifty in 1972, and then rocketed upwards to 
four-hundred per every 100,000 residents, its all-time high, 
in 1998.161 Again, other major urban centers showed similar 
trends.162 It is important to note that as the crime rate decreased 
during the Gilded Age, the incarceration rate also decreased.163 
However, this Article will demonstrate that in the second half 
of the twentieth century the incarceration rate’s increases 
and decreases seemed to be unaffected by, and unaffecting of, 
fluctuations in the crime rate.164
2. Treatment of Suspect Classes
Members of suspect classes received fairer treatment under 
the criminal justice system of the Gilded Age in the North than 
one might expect. This is not to say that discrimination was not 
rampant at the time; harmful discrimination on the basis of sex, 
race, and national origin was not only pervasive, but also legally 
sanctioned in ways that are unthinkable now. Yet, within the 
criminal justice system, there was a surprising amount of lenity 
toward these classes.
For example, take the case of women who murder their 
abusive husbands or boyfriends. Many times these killings 
occur, not in the midst of an attack by the abusive partner, 
but following a plan laid out by the abused partner. In recent 
decades, evidence of “battered woman’s syndrome” offers a 
small chance of outright acquittal for defendants and represents 
a hard won transformation of the self-defense rule in support of 
abuse victims.165
One might expect that the chances for women on trial 
would have been far worse a century ago, but, in fact, they were 
far more successful in receiving acquittals for these acts than 
their counterparts are today. As Stuntz puts it:
[i]n the Gilded Age, more than 80 percent of Chicago 
women who killed their husbands escaped punish-
ment—among white women, the figure topped 90  
percent—thanks to what contemporaries called ‘the 
new unwritten law’ granting women broad rights  
of self-defense, even when no history of domestic  
violence was proved.166
This trend existed, not just in Chicago, but in all the major, 
industrializing cities of the time.167
African Americans also received fairer treatment than 
might be expected. Studies of nineteenth century Philadelphia 
and Chicago have shown that black men fared equally well 
as white men when accused of murder.168 In either case, even 
where discrimination and disparate impacts were clearly mea-
surable, there was nothing like the massive racial imbalance 
that exists in the prison population today. Historians, such as 
Lane and Adler suggest that African American defendants fared 
better proportionately than their counterparts today because all 
defendants, regardless of race or national origins, fared better 
than defendants today.169 “A mere twenty-two percent of turn-
of-the-century Chicago homicides led to criminal convictions; 
Chicago juries were quick to acquit in cases in which the killing 
seemed plausibly excusable.”170 Adler in particular notes that 
generic self-defense arguments nearly always persuaded jurors 
of the era.171
We now turn to how this system came about and its chief 
characteristics.
3. Origins
At the time of the founding of the U.S., crime victims 
brought charges directly against the alleged criminal, and the 
victims, not public prosecutors, decided which crimes merited 
prosecution and which did not.172 In that way, criminal law 
functioned far more like civil law functions today. Most urban 
centers did not have professional police forces, but rather 
groups of ordinary citizens taking part as night watchmen.173 
Prosecutors received piecework pay and would simply have to 
“ratify the choices of constables or crime victims.”174 Substantive 
criminal law was the product of judge-made decisions rather 
than of legislatures; due to this fact, it reflected more nearly the 
conflicts of individuals against other individuals as found in the 
Common Law and in Blackstone’s Commentaries, rather than 
the public policy decisions of legislatures.175
In the years leading up to the Civil War, in response to the 
arriving immigrant populations, many institutional reforms took 
place. Prosecutors became publicly elected officials, salaries 
replaced piecework pay, and the new politicization rewarded 
those prosecutors who punished crimes the public most wanted 
them to punish.176 Professional police forces replaced the groups 
of watchmen.177 What was once a system overseen by weak state 
officials became larger, more democratic, and more controlled 
by urban political machines.
The goal of the institutional reforms may have been to 
protect the native-born population from young immigrant men, 
but the long-term effect was to empower those men. As Stuntz 
puts it, “[b]y the [nineteenth] century’s end, most of the cities of 
the Northeast and Midwest were ruled by immigrants and their 
children.”178 “They dominated local police forces—Irish cops 
decided which Irish criminals to arrest.”179
4. Key Traits: Common, Less Procedural Trials; Robust 
Criminal Intent Requirements; and Local Control
By the late nineteenth century the institutional reforms in 
the Northern cities developed three basic characteristics that 
differentiate it from criminal justice today: (1) trials focused 
less on procedure and were more common; (2) substantive 
criminal law, particularly that of criminal intent, was more 
vague and more open to defense arguments; and (3) there was 
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local control, meaning the communities where law enforcement 
was most active were the ones that had the greatest amount of 
political power over the system.180
First, trials were far more common. Today ninety-five 
percent of felony convictions are obtained by guilty plea.181 Jury 
acquittals are rare; trials as a whole are rare. At the turn of the 
last century, however, sixty percent of felony charges ended 
in conviction and far fewer defendants plead guilty.182 Stuntz 
argues that this difference was due in large part to the lack of 
procedural rules and protections that applied during the Gilded 
Age.183 Scrutinizing criminal procedures, police practices, 
and trial procedure requires lengthy 
trials, extensive motion practice, and 
expensive trial lawyers, all of which 
make trials less common. These ideas 
are explored more thoroughly in the 
next section. The important matter 
here is that the Gilded Age system 
was markedly different from our own.
Again, Stuntz puts it best:
Trials and acquittals alike were 
far more common than today . 
. . Because acquittals happened 
frequently, they were also less 
newsworthy than today. So, in 
the Gilded Age Northeast, pros-
ecutors paid a smaller political 
price for acquittals and were less 
eager to avoid them today. Note 
the logic: less elaborate trial 
procedures helped defendants—
not the government—by making 
both trials and acquittals ordinary 
events. Prosecutors do not invest 
heavily in avoiding outcomes 
that seemed ordinary.184
Second, criminal intent had a 
much larger role to play. Jurors in the 
Gilded Age were not limited to deter-
mining the weight to be given various 
pieces of evidence—they were not 
merely the “lie detectors” that they 
have since become.185 Rather, when 
deciding upon the existence of scienter, criminal intent, they 
were often judging whether the defendant deserved punish-
ment.186 The concept of scienter, the “vicious will” that must 
accompany all crimes, was far more vague then.187 This opened 
up trials to many types of defense arguments regarding the 
circumstances of the defendant’s life, his character, etc.—argu-
ments that are only rarely or indirectly approachable today.188 
How and why the scienter requirement has been minimized 
is explored in greater depth in the next part of this Article.
Third, the communities of working-immigrants, the ones 
most affected by the administration of criminal justice, were the 
ones that had the most power over it. Prosecutors and judges in 
the U.S. today are most commonly elected at the county level.189 
A century ago, local municipal governments were far more 
active than the state and federal governments and, in metropolitan 
counties, communities of immigrants and the poor had immense 
political clout due to their large populations.190 Powerful urban 
political machines developed to elect judges, prosecutors, and 
councilmen—these machines thrived 
on votes from these communities and 
answered to them. Jury pools also 
consisted of people from these com-
munities.191 Again, this all changed 
in the late twentieth century, when 
the suburban populations within 
these counties bloomed and assumed 
political power over the system and 
representation in the jury pool.192
As an aside, The Gilded Age 
system of the Northeastern and 
Midwestern cities is the focus of 
this movement because the Southern 
criminal justice system was quite 
distinct from it. Throughout the 
South, during this time, imprisonment 
rates and incarceration rates were 
much higher than in the North.193 One 
key feature that was missing from 
the Southern criminal justice was 
local control. African Americans and 
poorer Southern whites were the vic-
tims of massive disenfranchisement 
schemes common during the post-
Reconstruction era; these schemes left 
these groups with little control over 
the criminal justice system, though 
they were its chief targets.194
We now turn to how this system 
of justice changed and became the 
criminal justice system we have in 
the U.S. today.
B. The demIse of The gILded age sysTem  
 and The rIse of mass IncarceraTIon
Following World War II, the U.S. saw an increase in crime 
spanning two generations.195 Starting in the mid-1950s and 
continuing into the early 1970s, the nationwide homicide rate 
doubled, while the homicide rates of larger cities multiplied 
The concept of scienter, 
the “vicious will” that 
must accompany all 
crimes, was far more 
vague then. This 
opened up trials to 
many types of defense 
arguments regarding 
the circumstances of 
the defendant’s life, 
his character, etc.—
arguments that are 
only rarely or indirectly 
approachable today. 
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even more dramatically.196 Detroit’s rate multiplied by eight, 
New York’s by six, and most other cities had their rates either 
triple or quadruple.197 Although the nationwide crime rate 
stabilized at a new higher rate in the 1970s, the crime rate in 
larger cities still continued to climb until the modest crime drop 
that began in the 1990s.198
The crime rate may have progressed in one direction, but 
the reaction to crime did not. At first, between the years 1950 
and 1972, the rise in crime was met with increased leniency: 
“Chicago’s murder rate tripled between 1950 and 1972, while 
Illinois’s imprisonment rate fell [forty-four] percent. In New 
York City, murder more than quintupled in those twenty-two 
years; the state’s imprisonment rate fell by more the one-third. 
Detroit saw murders multiply seven times; imprisonment 
in Michigan declined by thirty percent.”199 That seemingly 
inexplicable leniency was then replaced by a massive increase 
in punishment. In the 1960s, the number of prison-years per 
murder fell by half and then, between 1970 and 2000, increased 
ninefold.200 During this time, the incarceration rate went from 
one the lowest in the world to the absolute highest.201 The 
increase in punishment for the African American community 
was even more dramatic.202 Many attribute the increase in the 
inmate population to mandatory-minimum sentences, three-
strikes laws, and the war on drugs, but even if one removes all 
the drug convictions from the data, the inmate population would 
still have quadrupled.203 The bulk of the increase simply has to 
do with the fact that the government is arresting and imprisoning 
more people than before.
Why was the crime wave faced first with leniency, and 
then unprecedented outrage? The answer involves three major 
changes to the criminal justice system that had taken place: (1) 
political control shifted from the communities that were most 
affected by crime to those that were not; (2) the Warren Court’s 
emphasis on protections for criminal defendants caused a “tough 
on crime” political backlash; and (3) substantive criminal law 
became less open to defenses and more the subject of official 
discretion.204
1. Loss of Local Control
In the years following World War II, prosecutors and trial 
judges were still elected at the county level, but the majority of 
votes coming from within those counties moved from the cities 
to the suburbs.
In the 1940, Chicagoans were 70 percent of the popu-
lation of the Chicago metropolitan area; by 1960 their 
share had fallen to 57 percent, by 1980 to 42 percent. 
During the same years, Cleveland’s percentage of  
its metropolitan area fell from 69 to 49, then to 30. 
Detroit’s fell from 68 to 44, then to 28.205
Suburban voters, for whom crime was not a pressing 
concern, outnumbered city voters. Even within the cities, crime 
was concentrated to particular neighborhoods, and those in 
more affluent and safer neighborhoods outnumbered those in 
the crime-ridden ones. Prosecutors and Judges, likewise, now 
rely on these suburban voters for their jobs. While law enforcement 
focuses its efforts on poorer neighborhoods, it is accountable to 
the desires of suburban voters who are distant from the effects 
of crime and criminal justice.
This distance explains both the excessive lenience during 
the first part of the late-twentieth century crime wave, and the 
incredible punitive turn in the second part. When the crime 
wave first began, suburban voters were insulated from it and 
did not notice or feel the need to respond; further spending on 
criminal justice, to them, may have felt like a waste. By the 
late 1960s, however, riots in big cities and the Warren Court’s 
new protections for criminal defendants were highly politicized; 
politicians stirred up the indignation of these voting blocs to 
support “tough on crime” initiatives.206 The voters obliged and 
were distanced from the costs of doing so. Stuntz describes the 
phenomenon as follows:
With respect to crime and criminal punishment,  
residents of all neighborhoods, safe and dangerous 
alike, have two warring incentives. On the one hand, 
they want safe streets on which to go about their busi-
ness; they want to travel to parks and schools and 
stores without fearing for their lives and property. On 
the other hand, they are loath to incarcerate their sons 
and brothers, neighbors and friends. … Local political  
control over criminal justice harnesses both forces 
without giving precedence to either.207
With the loss of local political control, we also lost stability 
in our response to crime.208 The specifics of the backlash to the 
Warren Court and the features of tough on crime legislation 
deepened the mass incarceration problem.
2. The Warren Court and Backlash
The Warren Court introduced a number of innovations to 
the area of criminal procedure. The Court expanded warrant 
requirements and rights to counsel; it gave criminal defendants 
protections against police questioning in Miranda;209 and it 
applied the exclusionary rule against the states in Mapp.210 
Though the motivation behind these rulings was undoubtedly 
to make the administration of criminal justice more fair and less 
discriminatory, the effect may have been the opposite. Some 
argue that these rules have made it more difficult to differentiate 
between the innocent and guilty, and may have, on balance, 
wound up benefiting the guilty more.211 Sophisticated defen-
dants, chronic recidivists and the wealthy, could navigate their 
new rights more deftly than the innocent or the poor.212 On the 
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other hand, others argue that by focusing on criminal procedure, 
rather than the substance of criminal law, the protections of 
the Warren Court were more easily subverted by later Court 
rulings and legislatures who could broaden waiver rules and 
redefine crimes to escape the new procedural scrutiny; thereby, 
endangering the innocent.213
Although there are many differing viewpoints regarding 
how correctly these cases were decided, it is generally agreed 
that the timing of the Warren Court’s decisions worked against 
its aims.214 The Warren Court introduced all these protections 
for criminal defendants at a time when the crime rate was 
skyrocketing, fueling the rage of politicians and the public 
and resulting in the “tough on crime” movement and mass 
incarceration.215 Crime and anti-Warren Court rhetoric was 
prominently featured in campaigns for President and in the 
campaigns for state governorships.216 Though Republican 
governors and legislatures led the way, the officials from all 
states wanted to appear as punitive as possible.217 And, because 
the votes they were vying for were the votes of suburban voters 
crying for more punishment, there was no incentive for officials 
to argue for leniency. “They were the votes of those for whom 
crime was at once frightening and distant, those who read about 
open-air drug markets and the latest gang shootings in the morn-
ing paper. Neighborhood democracy faded, and was replaced by 
a democracy of angry neighbors.”218
Stuntz provides an account of the 1986 legislation that set 
the sentencing ratio between crack and powder cocaine, which 
serves as a good illustration of the “tough on crime” movement:
“In congressional debates preceding the passage of the 
bill, one member proposed a weight/sentencing ratio  
of twenty to one; another suggested fifty to one.219 One 
hundred to one, the ratio finally enacted, was the highest  
anyone proposed. Crack-powder legislation was the 
product of an auction, not a political compromise.”220
Without the balanced impulses of locally controlled criminal 
justice, legislators, courts, and prosecutors were unchecked 
in their drive to punish. The new punitive movement did not 
just increase criminal punishment, but changed the nature of 
criminal laws.221
3. Substantive Criminal Law Becomes More 
Indirect and Less Focused on Intent
In order to dodge the procedural rules put in place by the 
Warren Court, state legislatures redefined crimes, specifically 
minimizing criminal intent.222 Drug charges as a whole are 
often used as indirect ways of punishing others for more violent 
offenses that are harder to prove.223 Urban gangs are adept at 
intimidating witnesses, which limits prosecutors’ ability to 
convict members of violent crimes, resulting in prosecutors 
charging gang members with easier-to-prove drug offenses that 
carry hefty penalties.224 “Charge stacking” is another tool for 
the prosecutor, whereby they charge an offender with multiple 
offenses based on the same conduct, and engage in bargaining 
with the offender to reduce the amount of charges, in exchange 
for a plea.225 In addition, legislatures have obliged prosecutors 
by developing many related series of crimes that survive the 
double jeopardy rule.226
At the same time, trial judges and juries have lost much 
discretion over sentencing due to mandatory minimum laws, 
repeat offender laws, and sentencing guidelines.227 These rules 
have not limited prosecutors; in fact, they have contributed 
to the power the prosecutor has during plea-bargaining.228 
Appellate judges, legislators, and prosecutors matter more 
in the current system, and the moral evaluations of trial judges 
and juries matter less.229
By the time the modest crime drop of the 1990s began 
and crime slowly went off national political radar, the criminal 
justice system had been massively transformed from the one we 
had in the Gilded Age.
During the Gilded Age, the working class immigrants 
had a great amount of control over the system through three 
mechanisms: (1) powerful urban political machines, run on 
immigrant votes, which elected the prosecutors, judges, and city 
council members; (2) jury pools that drew from the very same 
working class neighborhoods where crimes occurred; and (3) 
the “scienter” element required for all crimes which allowed 
juries and lawyers to take into account a wide variety of moral 
and legal arguments.230 By the time the Great Migration of 
African Americans came about, none of these three mechanisms 
was available. No wonder the two migrations resulted in vastly 
different treatment of the immigrants.
v. The shared vaLues BeTween  
The Two movemenTs
The two approaches to criminal justice laid out in this 
article, the Restorative Justice movement and the Gilded Age 
system, pose comprehensive challenges to our current criminal 
justice system. Though they developed separately, their 
criticisms of the current system and visions for better criminal 
justice systems are manifested by their shared values of 
communitarianism and flexibility in the administration of 
justice. Although Restorative Justice proponents have often 
presented their movement as a wholly separate from the criminal 
justice systems that have existed for nearly a millennium in 
Western states, aspects of Restorative Justice principles are 
evident in the modern American system.
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a. communITarIanIsm
John Braithwaite posits that, in order for reintegrative 
shaming—the goal of Restorative Justice programs—to 
work, communitarianism must exist or be supported by the 
justice system.231 A communitarian society acknowledges the 
interdependencies that exist between people in a community, 
fostering mutual respect and trust, and encouraging people to 
take responsibility for one another.232 These societies, so central 
to the Restorative Justice vision, were exemplified by the urban 
centers in the Gilded Age.233 Stuntz describes the Gilded Age 
system as follows:
Cops, crime victims, criminals, and jurors who judged 
them—these were not wholly distinct communities; 
they overlapped, and the overlaps could be large. Rage 
at the depredations of criminals was tempered by empathy 
for defendants charged with crime: one hesitates before 
sending neighbors’ sons to the state penitentiary. In 
such a system, those tempted to commit serious crimes 
could be reasonably confident that they would get a 
fair shake—which probably made the temptation less 
powerful. To use more contemporary terminology, the 
justice system of the Gilded Age relied heavily on soft 
power and social capital to deter crime.234
This is precisely the society advocated for by many 
Restorative Justice proponents. The disappearance of this 
balanced, communitarian society in the mid-twentieth century 
resulted in the excess of punishment we have today.
B. fLexIBILITy In The admInIsTraTIon of JusTIce
The Restorative Justice movement places great value 
on flexibility in the administration of justice. The needs of the 
particular victim and offender are at the center of any Restorative 
Justice program; plans for reparation are unique to the situation 
and to the specific culpability of each offender.235 Furthermore, 
the proceedings are informal, direct verbal communication is 
encouraged, and the offense is framed in ways that relate to the 
experiences of those involved.236
Again, the Gilded Age system was remarkably in line with 
these traits. As opposed to the modern day system, trials were 
common and they focused far less on procedure.237 Criminal 
intent was open to a wider variety of defenses.238 Substantive 
criminal law was still the province of judge-made decisions and 
the common law, based on the conflicts between individuals 
rather than reflections of a legislature’s policies.239
c. gILded age success as a resPonse  
 To resToraTIve JusTIce crITIcs
The major criticisms of Restorative Justice have centered 
on fears that large scale implementation of these programs 
might be excessively oppressive or lenient. On the one hand, 
community control may devolve into mob justice, and hounding 
of minority groups within those communities. On the other hand, 
communities may not enforce the laws, letting favored or pow-
erful members of their communities go free when prosecution 
is appropriate.240
When we look to the Gilded Age system, however, these 
fears appear to be unfounded. The hallmarks of the system were 
its stability in rates of punishment, and its surprisingly fair treat-
ment of suspect classes.241 It is the more systemized, uniform 
system we have today that has produced excesses in leniency and 
punishment, and disproportionate punishment of minority groups.
Critics also question whether community control is even 
possible.242 This criticism stems from Restorative Justice propo-
nents’ own insistence that their mechanisms are drawn directly 
from indigenous and pre-modern origins and are wholly sepa-
rate from the systems that have existed in the West for nearly 
a millennium.243 Critics have questioned whether these systems 
can be revived in societies were communal relations are not as 
strong as those in tribes or small villages.244
Again, the Gilded Age system offers a response, albeit a 
measured one, to these criticisms. Although the urban neigh-
borhoods of the industrializing and increasingly heterogeneous 
Gilded Age may have been marginally more tightly knit than 
neighborhoods today, they were far more like our society than 
the societies several centuries earlier before the state takeover 
of the criminal justice system.245 Juries drawn from these com-
munities, along with judges and prosecutors, were able exercise 
the control necessary to keep both incarceration and crime rates 
low.246 Furthermore, major studies of U.S. communities that are 
plagued by both crime and incarceration, have found that shame 
imposed by their communities has a profound impression on 
members who have been convicted of offenses. Moreover, the 
stigmatizing nature of the shame created by the conventional 
criminal justice system prevents offenders from ever truly 
re-entering society.247 Consequently, it appears that our society 
would prefer a system more in line with Restorative Principles, 
and would also be able to implement it.
vI. concLusIon
In many ways the new Restorative Justice movement can 
be seen as responding to certain needs that have gone unfulfilled 
since the Gilded Age. Though the two systems have several 
differences, the Gilded Age system tested the most controversial 
aspects of Restorative Justice—community control and rela-
tively lax procedural protections—and achieved good results. 
Restorative Justice theorists have often debated what relation-
ship their programs should have with the criminal justice as 
administered by the states; whether they should position their 
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movement to complement that system or to outright replace it.248 
By examining the Gilded Age system, however, one can see 
how certain changes to the conventional criminal justice system 
might bring it more in line with Restorative Justice. These 
changes may include smaller geographic bases from which to 
elect prosecutors and judges and draw jurors; and legislation 
that bolsters criminal intent requirements, letting jurors’ and 
judges’ moral evaluations play a greater role in determining 
guilt or innocence. The connections between these movements, 
their mechanisms and principles, should prove useful for 
proponents of both approaches in seeking reforms.
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